When ships crash at sea

The Solong’s captain, a Russian national, was arrested and charged with negligence and manslaughter. The North Sea, a long-established hub for oil, gas, and now offshore wind energy, is heavily trafficked by vessels navigating between installations and coastal ports. As a coastal state, the UK has jurisdiction over activities within its maritime zones, but foreign-flagged vessels introduce questions of overlapping authority, governed primarily under maritime law.

Maritime Law and Jurisdiction

Maritime law, or admiralty law, covers private international law matters such as carriage of goods, collisions, salvage, and pollution. It intersects with public international law through conventions like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), which provides a framework for jurisdiction, sovereignty, and control over maritime activities. The UK acceded to UNCLOS in 1997 and is bound by key IMO treaties including:

• SOLAS (1974) – Safety of Life at Sea
• COLREG (1972) – Collision Regulations
• MARPOL (1973) – Prevention of Pollution
• STCW (1978) – Seafarer Training and Certification

These conventions establish standards for safe navigation and environmental protection applicable to member states and their vessels.

UK Coastal State Jurisdiction

The Solong–Stena collision occurred within UK coastal waters, meaning UK maritime law applied. Under UNCLOS, the UK exercises sovereignty over several maritime zones:

• Territorial Sea (12 nm) – Full sovereignty as on land
• Contiguous Zone (24 nm) – Limited enforcement powers
• Exclusive Economic Zone (200 nm) – Rights over resources and marine activities

These zones are part of a dense shipping corridor in the North Sea and English Channel—used by over 500 vessels daily. Offshore infrastructure further complicates navigation. The North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA) notes over 290 offshore installations and 250 subsea systems on the UK Continental Shelf alone.

The UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigates all maritime incidents within UK waters, including ship collisions. While MAIB inquiries focus on causes and safety lessons—not legal liability—they examined watchkeeping, fatigue, vessel condition, anchorage, and weather in the Solong case. Legal liability and fault fall under the purview of the admiralty courts.

To prevent such incidents, UK law—including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order 2013 (AOGBO)—extends collision-avoidance duties to vessels engaged in offshore energy operations. These duties include ensuring that systems and practices protect those on installations “as far as is reasonably practicable.” Regulation is enforced by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), particularly in response to risks underscored by disasters like Piper Alpha (1988), where 167 people died after a gas explosion on an oil platform.

Flag State Jurisdiction

While the collision happened in UK waters, the vessels involved were registered abroad. Flag State jurisdiction refers to the legal authority exercised by a ship’s country of registration—in this case, Portugal and the U.S. Under Article 91 of UNCLOS, ships possess the nationality of the state whose flag they fly. This includes exclusive jurisdiction over matters aboard the vessel, even on the high seas.

UNCLOS requires Flag States to ensure their ships comply with safety, environmental, and navigational standards—by conducting inspections, enforcing certification, and upholding IMO rules like COLREG, SOLAS, and MARPOL. These obligations include:

• Monitoring compliance with pollution prevention
• Conducting safety inspections
• Certifying vessels and seafarers
• Enforcing navigational standards

Not all Flag States are equally effective. Research by Corres and Pallis shows significant variance in enforcement and oversight, impacting vessel safety and environmental performance. As Robles observed in Vessel Collisions in the Law of the Sea, the burden lies with the Flag State to enforce what it has agreed to in international law.

Lessons from Recent Ship Collisions

Ship collisions can result in catastrophic loss of life, environmental harm, and economic cost. Several recent cases highlight the consequences of failing to follow navigational rules:

• 25 April 2024: Collision between the Greek-flagged tanker Apache and UK-flagged fishing vessel Serinah in the Firth of Clyde. The Serinah sank with loss of life.
• 24 October 2023: The Verity (Isle of Man) and Polesie (Bahamas) collided in the North Sea. The Verity sank and five lives were lost.
• 6 January 2018: The Panama-flagged tanker Sanchi and the Hong Kong-flagged CF Crystal collided near Shanghai. The Sanchi, carrying 136,000 tonnes of condensate, exploded and burned for over a week. All 32 crew perished; the incident caused massive environmental damage.

Each of these events underscores the importance of compliance with COLREGs, proper watchkeeping, training, and effective coordination between Flag and Coastal States.

Judicial Responses to Ship Collisions

In England and Wales, ship collision cases are tried in the Admiralty Court (High Court), while in Scotland, admiralty actions fall under Scottish court jurisdiction. These courts ultimately determine negligence in incidents such as the collision between the Solong and the Stena Immaculate. The Solong’s captain was arrested on charges of gross negligence manslaughter, to which he pleaded not guilty. The vessel’s owners also filed a legal claim against the Stena’s owners for contributory liability, a common route in maritime casualty claims aiming toward eventual settlement.

Where multiple vessels are involved, the court determines liability in proportion to each party’s fault. It considers reports by the MAIB and follows the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) guidance on navigational safety and the application of COLREGs. The Officer on Watch (OOW) is responsible for ensuring compliance. The MAIB’s preliminary findings show that the Solong’s master was alone on the bridge during the collision—despite requirements for a dedicated lookout at night and in poor visibility. Whether that amounted to negligence is for the court to decide.

Establishing contributory negligence can be complex and time-consuming. In a similar case, the Singapore-flagged X-Press Mahanada collided with the Kuwaiti-flagged Burgan at Chattogram in June 2019. The case reached London’s Admiralty Court in October 2024, with judgment delivered in March 2025. The Burgan was found primarily at fault for failing to navigate properly, maintain a lookout, or respond appropriately to the developing situation.

Conclusion

The Solong–Stena case illustrates recurring concerns in ship collisions: navigational practices, manning levels, fatigue, vessel maintenance, and environmental conditions. While international regulations provide guidance, compliance alone cannot prevent incidents—particularly in high-traffic zones like the North Sea. With the decline of oil and gas and the rise of offshore wind installations, the North-East Atlantic is becoming increasingly congested. MCA guidance urges mariners to adapt to new risks, including increased use of advanced onboard systems and remotely operated unmanned vessels (ROUVs).

Ship operators, captains, and OOWs must remain vigilant as global marine traffic grows, increasing collision risks. A thorough understanding and application of national and international collision regulations remain vital for safe navigation.

As Joseph Conrad aptly said in The Mirror of the Sea, “Ships are all right; it’s the men in ‘em…”