Time to act on safety

Legislation that eventually caught up with tankers will inevitably catch up with bulkers. But will we have to wait until a bulker pollutes a French beach with bunkers before there are any serious design changes legislated? The unfortunate thing, or fortunate depending on your point of view, is that bulkers rarely pollute when they sink and therefore aren?t subject to the same public pressure for improving safety margins as tankers. Who outside the industry can remember the names of sunken bulk carriers compared with names of sunken tankers? The Derbyshire is the obvious exception and that is largely because its owner and crew came from a country ? Britain ? where much of the specialist press and therefore influence is based. The only way forward is to adopt the same legislative process that affected tankers post-Exxon Valdez and that is further affecting them post-Erika. This is the only way to ensure a level playing field and remove substandard ships from the equation. The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has recently issued new guidelines for a safer bulk carrier fleet. But is it enough? Bulk carriers can receive such a pounding during unloading and loading that serious structural damage can occur way before corrosion sets in. The only way to guarantee bulldozers don?t damage the internal framework is to opt for a double hull. Building bulkers with double hulls would be good for safety, good for operations and good for the environment, according to Bureau Veritas? marine managing director Bernard Anne. In addition, a range of options has been proposed to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, one of which is to mandate the fitting of double hulls for small bulk carriers unable to survive the flooding of a single hold. However, there is a strong feeling within certain factions of the industry that double hulls would be generally justified for all bulk carrier newbuildings. RINA conference urges decision makers to act At a recent conference, hosted by RINA in London, Mr Justice Coleman (who conducted the High Court proceedings of the re-opened formal investigation (RFI) into the loss of the Derbyshire) said he strongly believed that 20 years is far too long before action is taken. The conference, ?Design and operation of bulk carriers: post Derbyshire?, was held to discuss the way forward following the RFI and comprised a number of technical papers and discussions centred around aspects of bulk carrier design. This included the vital subject of hatch cover strength to withstand extreme sea loads. Simon Milne, currently principal surveyor for passenger shipping safety and formerly a surveyor in the cargo ship safety branch at the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in the UK started his paper by saying that “the judge forcefully expressed concern about the safety levels implicit in the ILLC 66 standards”. He continued by quoting Coleman: “It can be concluded that the requirements of ILLC66 are set at a minimum level in relation to which there is substantial risk of exceedence at the forward hatch covers if a vessel such as the Derbyshire is caught in a typhoon similar to Orchid or in similar conditions and making any speed over the ground and some risk if it is not.” The judge went on to say: “?consequently, these requirements could only be regarded as adequate if that risk were very substantially discounted because of the low incidence of loss experience since ILLC 66 came into force and/or because of the additional cost that would be involved in increasing the level of protection for new buildings and for existing vessels.” The report concluded that the minimum hatch cover strength requirements laid down for forward hatches in ILLC 66 in conjunction with the prescribed minimum permissible freeboard for B-60 bulk carriers of similar size to Derbyshire are seriously deficient in the context of present day concepts of acceptable safety standards. Apart from the obvious recommendations from the judge, such as storm avoidance and battening down the hatches for bad weather, he recommends that a testing programme be carried out to ascertain to what extent ILLC 66 needs to be amended with regard to the minimum permissible freeboard of cape size and Panamax bulk carriers and whether URS21 provides for minimum hatch cover strength of such vessels. Milne said that: “?the standards for steel hatch covers in the ILLC 66 allow for a standard wave load of 1.75 tonnes/m2 on the hatch cover, with a factor of 4.25 on the ultimate tensile stress (UTS) of the steel. There are also stiffness and minimum thickness requirements to prevent distortion of the hatch cover leading to leakage. “The requirement for wave loading appears low because it is related to the UK regulations for wooden hatch covers of the early 1900s,” explains Milne. “The factor, conversely, is very much higher than would be expected in a modern engineering design code (where 1.1 to 1.25 might be more typical), but it fails to recognise the possibility of buckling failure.” He says that a modern cover designed to these requirements would be expected to fail, usually due to buckling, at up to 4.2 tonnes/m2 if well built in good condition. URS21 was developed using more modern methods in the mid-1990s and takes into account design wave load, freeboard and position of the cover on the deck in addition to the length, speed and block coefficient of the ship. Milne explains that “the design wave load is therefore different for every ship and for each cover but would have been about 5.5 tonnes/m2 for the Derbyshire and in the range of about five to six tonnes/m2 for large bulk carriers. Added to this there needs to be a safety factor on yield in tension of 1.25 and shear making sure that the design is resistant to premature buckling and a corrosion allowance. There have been a number of studies carried out into freeboard and the effects of green water on the hatches and hatch cover strength. What is needed now is for the various bodies to stop bickering over the validity of the data and designing for a minimum specification. Heavier scantlings and better specifications are the main aspects that can lead to improved safety of life at sea which, in the end, is what is important. Designing for a minimum specification is what contributed to causing the problem in the first place. Cost of upgrading covers David Byrne, managing director of the cargo access design company Transmarine, carried out a study into the cost implications of modifying both No 1 and 2 hatches, as covered by IACS in its new URS21 requirement for weather deck covers forward of 0.25L. His conclusions show that the total cost for upgrading a bulker to URS21 standards for a new ship is between £42,600 ($60,950) and £63,000 or roughly 4% of the total cost of a set of nine covers. This would increase the weight of hatch covers by an estimated 33%, a substantial figure over the base ILLC66 requirements to meet URS21 and is an indictment of the inadequacy of the ILLC66 specifications. Costs rise quite substantially for replacing covers on existing ships (between £265,000 and £374,000) although it might be possible to reinforce existing covers at a lower cost but the associated technical problems might make this solution impractical. Poor seamanship linked to bulker sinkings If enough water enters a ship?s hull, it will lose its buoyancy and sink. This statement may seem absurdly obvious but, according to Captain D Barber speaking at RINA?s international conference, it is an alarming fact that it is at the root of all bulk carrier losses. This was one of the main issues which came to light during the RFI investigation into the loss of the Derbyshire and, in particular, proposals to improve the weather tight integrity of the fore ends of bulk carriers and raising awareness of the possible dangerous consequences of water entry into forward spaces and the resultant reduction of freeboard. Crucial to this proposal is the aspect of seamanship and ship operations, or rather the lack of it. A background paper on the theme of flooding was submitted to IMO?s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC74) in June 2001, which convened a bulk carrier working group to discuss the problem. It addressed those items that it was felt could be disseminated to the world shipping community ahead of any change in legislation for which a considerable passage of time would be necessary. The method used for promulgation was the IMO Circular, a document issued by MCA?s Cargo Ship Branch to administrations around the world with the further request that they alert ships, and their operators flying their flags, to its contents. In particular, the recognition of the speed with which bulk carriers can sink, especially when loaded with heavy cargoes, may not be obvious to all. Although primary responsibility for keeping a ship seaworthy lies with the master, the dilemma which many face is one of commercial pressure from the owners, operators and managers. Those who are in a position to exert this pressure, even unwittingly, have to be targeted and that is why the authors sought to include these groups to raise their awareness to these dangers. The combined effect of cutting corners on maintenance and crews can lead to fatal consequences and operators need to recognise that resources should be assigned to both functions otherwise rapid deterioration of the ship?s fabric will occur which will be compounded by poorly trained and understaffed crews. Access to holds such as ?manhole hatches? are often the type which have cleats and wingnuts to secure the trapdoors against rubber seals and, unless these are properly secured, can become potential danger points. Another preventative measure is to take regular soundings as part of any ship?s Safety Management System (SMS) and to record these in the sounding book. It can provide an early warning system that could prevent a catastrophe. Where bilge alarms are fitted they should be regularly tested, particularly those in the forward part of the ship. Often, however, no bilge alarms are fitted in forward spaces and, since these are permanently unmanned, this is a serious omission in the regulatory requirements. The circular will seek to encourage owners to do so although it cannot insist on it. One solution would be for insurers to either encourage this type of installation or insist on it rather than waiting for legislation or class regulation. Similarly, the SMS should include regular testing of the pumping system and working of the valves. Evasive action Evasive action to avoid severe weather systems in the region in which the ship is navigating is another area where many masters appear to have surrendered their authority as a result of weather routeing. This is a service used by many ships usually at the insistence of charterers to improve the ship?s performance during the voyage by using technology to find the optimum route. The master may be under considerable pressure not to deviate from the routeing advice given for fear of incurring commercial penalties. A short delay, however, is far better than a permanent one and there is no virtue in pressing on with a voyage without considering evasive action in sufficient time for it to be effective. The International Safety Management (ISM) code insists that the master retains overriding authority and should therefore feel able to challenge routeing instructions. In spite of the code, it is a brave master who dares challenge any issue in the name of safety if it is deemed to adversely affect the commercial interests of the shipowner or charter party. In return, masters should keep owners or managers advised when weather conditions necessitate evasive action and these reports should include position, course and speed. It was therefore recommended at the Derbyshire RFI that there should be compulsory daily reporting of the position of all vessels although this may be overtaken by requirements for all ships to have voyage data recorders. Optimisation of ship?s scantlings has not only affected the structural aspects of a vessel but also its powering arrangements. This is particularly the case with bulk carrier designs where the power of main engines has been significantly reduced. Typically, a 150,000 dwt Capesize bulker is usually fitted with a 11-12,000kW power unit compared to 18-19,000kW in the early 1980s. While this has achieved a reduction in fuel consumption from a daily 65t to 45t, it has had the effect of restricting the options available to the master jeopardising the vessel?s ability to manoeuvre in severe weather. Stating the obvious It is easy to be cynical about the effectiveness of the IMO circular but to do nothing at all would be a failure of duty and an abrogation of responsibility. Effectiveness of operational systems needs to be addressed in order to prevent catastrophic accidents or foundering occurring as a result of crew incompetence and even outright stupidity. Smaller crews mean more stress, which leads to errors of judgement and skimping or cutting corners to the detriment of safety. Highlighting this situation and stating the obvious can only do good but it remains to be seen whether all parties involved are sufficiently motivated to use it in a constructive manner. Of particular concern is the issue of supporting the master as the ultimate judge of the seaworthiness of his vessel. What can a master effectively do in the face of opinions from the management, which has carried out repairs to his ship, the classification societies, the vetting inspectors of the charterers and the owner? If he does protest then he will be home soon and may well have to find another job.